Fast keyed hash/pseudo-random function using SIMD multiply and permute by Alakuijala, Jyrki et al.
Fast keyed hash/pseudo-random function using
SIMD multiply and permute
J. Alakuijala, B. Cox, and J. Wassenberg
Google Research
February 7, 2017
Abstract
HighwayHash is a new pseudo-random function based on SIMD
multiply and permute instructions for thorough and fast hashing. It
is 5.2 times as fast as SipHash for 1 KiB inputs. An open-source
implementation is available under a permissive license. We discuss
design choices and provide statistical analysis, speed measurements and
preliminary cryptanalysis. Assuming it withstands further analysis,
strengthened variants may also substantially accelerate file checksums
and stream ciphers.
1 Introduction
Hash functions are widely used for message authentication, efficient searching
and ‘random’ decisions. When attackers are able to find collisions (multiple
inputs with the same hash result), they can mount denial of service attacks
or disturb applications expecting uniformly distributed inputs. So-called
‘keyed-hash’ functions prevent this by using a secret key to ensure the outputs
are unpredictable. These functions are constructed such that an attacker who
controls the inputs still cannot deduce the key, nor predict future outputs.
The authors of SipHash refer to these as ‘strong pseudo-random functions’
[1]. However, existing approaches are too slow for large-scale use. In this
paper, we introduce two alternatives that are about 2 and 5 times as fast as
SipHash.
We are mainly interested in generating random numbers and message
authentication, for which 64-bit hashes are sufficient. These are not ‘collision-
resistant’ because adversaries willing to spend considerable CPU time could
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find a collision after hashing about
√
pi
2 2
64 inputs. However, small hashes
decrease transmission overhead and are suitable for authenticating short-
lived messages such as network/RPC packets. If needed, our approach can
generate up to 256 hash bits at no extra cost.
Section 2 briefly discusses existing hash functions and their strength/speed
tradeoff. Section 3 describes SipTreeHash, a j-lanes extension of SipHash
that is twice as fast on large inputs. However, the SipHash construction is
relatively slow because it relies on rotate instructions not available in SIMD
instruction sets. Section 4 introduces HighwayHash, a novel hash function
that takes advantage of SIMD permute instructions for fast and thorough
mixing. Measurements in Section 5 indicate SipTreeHash is twice as fast
as SipHash for large inputs, and HighwayHash five times as fast. Section 6
describes our test suite and shows that HighwayHash resists common attack
techniques from the literature. Further study may require new cryptanalysis
techniques.
2 Related Work
Current cryptographic hashes require at least 2-3 CPU cycles per byte [2],
which is about an order of magnitude slower than fast hashes such as CityHash
(0.23 c/b). Such a difference is unacceptable to practitioners, especially if
they are unconcerned about security. SipHash [1] is a good compromise
that has been studied since 2012 without any known weaknesses. Our
implementation requires about 1.25 c/b. Although relatively inexpensive
for a strong hash, this is still at least five times slower than fast hashes
such as Murmur3 and CityHash. However, these are vulnerable to collision
and key extraction attacks [3] and must not be exposed to untrusted inputs.
Several approaches have subsequently been proposed for taking advantage of
hardware-accelerated AES encryption [4, 5]. These include security proofs
and are about twice as fast as SipHash. The recent CLHash [6] is even faster
despite requiring 1064 byte keys. However, its mixing is insufficient to pass
smhasher’s avalanche test. A proposed fix adds an additional round of the
ad-hoc Murmur mixing function, but this still fails our distribution test for
zero-valued inputs (see Section 6.1). Note that CLHash was designed for
speed and almost-universality, and is not intended to withstand attacks [7].
We believe that SipHash remains a good default choice for non-cryptographic
applications because it offers (apparently) enough security at reasonable
speeds. A version with only 1 update and 3 finalization rounds is 1.2 to 1.9
times as fast (see Section 5) while still passing smhasher, which makes it an
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interesting candidate for applications where security is less of a concern.
We develop two alternatives that further increase throughput while
retaining the simplicity and thorough mixing of SipHash. We hope that these
algorithms will replace unsafe hash functions and increase the robustness of
applications without incurring excessive CPU cost.
3 SipTreeHash
Maximizing performance on modern CPUs usually requires the use of SIMD
instructions. These apply the same operation (e.g. addition) to multiple
‘lanes’ (elements) of a vector. This works best for data-parallel problems.
However, the SipHash dependency chain offers limited parallelism and cannot
fully utilize the four AVX2 vector lanes. Our SIMD implementation was
actually slower than the scalar version, presumably because of the lack
of bit rotation instructions. We instead compute four independent hash
results by logically partitioning input buffers into interleaved 64-bit pieces.
For example, consider a 64 byte input interpreted as eight 64-bit words:
A0, A1, A2, A3, B0, B1, B2, B3. These can be combined into four hash results
with two updates, one with Ai and the other with Bi. We must then fold
the four results into a single hash. XOR reduction is unsuitable because it
cannot distinguish between permutations of the 64-bit words. Instead, we
can just hash the results. This is known as a tree-hash construction and has
been used to accelerate SHA-256 [8]. Being a straightforward extension of
SipHash, this construction is likely to be secure. However, its hash results
are of course different, so this cannot be used as a drop-in replacement. Our
implementation [9] is available as open source software under the Apache 2
license. We suggest HighwayHash be considered instead because it is much
faster, especially for smaller inputs.
4 HighwayHash
Tree hash constructions can make efficient use of SIMD instructions. However,
the SipHash add-rotate-XOR construction is not ideally suited for current
instruction sets. As previously mentioned, bit rotations must be implemented
by ORing together the result of left and right shifts. Although rotations
of multiples of 8 bits can be implemented with very fast byte permute
instructions, this would weaken SipHash to an unacceptable degree [1]. The
individual add and XOR instructions also only achieve a weak mixing effect.
By contrast, AVX2 includes 32× 32 bit multiplication instructions that mix
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their operands much more thoroughly. Although their latency is higher than
non-SIMD multiplies (5 vs 3 cycles [10]), we believe the increase in mixing
efficiency vs. add/XOR is still worthwhile. The 64-bit Intel architecture also
provides 16 SIMD registers, which is enough to perform two multiplies in
parallel and thus hide some of the latency. Given that multiplications are
efficient, we now propose a new permutation step for strong hashing.
4.1 Zipper Merge
Intuitively, it is clear that the highest and lowest bits of a multiplication
result are more predictable. This is the basis of the (problematic) “middle
square” random generator [11], which only retains the middle digits of a
multiplication result. We introduce a simple but seemingly novel approach:
mixing multiplication results with byte-level permute instructions.
Let us derive a suitable permutation. Recall that inputs are 64-bit
multiplication results that will become 32-bit multiplicands in the next update
round. It therefore makes sense to concentrate the poorly-distributed top and
bottom bytes in the upper 32 bits to ensure the multiplier bytes are uniformly
good (requirement 1). To increase mixing, we also wish to interleave bytes
from the neighboring SIMD lane, ideally with no more than two adjacent
bytes from the same lane (requirement 2). Mostly importantly, we strive to
equalize the ‘quality’ of each byte within a 64-bit lane (requirement 3). We
approximate this by counting the minimum distance of each bit’s position
from the ends of its lane, computing the sum of these distances for the bits
in a byte, and sorting these sums in decreasing order. By this measure, bytes
3 and 4 are best, 2, 5, 1, 6 are adequate, and 0 and 7 are worst. Permutation
results Ri for a 16 byte lane pair Si are expressed as hexadecimal offsets Pi,
such that Ri = SPi . In other words, the i-th offset indicates which source
byte to copy into the i-th result byte. Let i = 15 be listed first and i = 0
last. A partial permutation satisfying requirements 1 and 2 takes the form 7
8 6 9 ? ? ? ? 0 F 1 E ? ? ? ?. To see this, note that the source
lanes (offset divided by 8) alternate, and that the byte offsets (modulo 8)
are 7 0 6 1, which are the worst as mentioned. It remains to distribute
bytes 2-5 and A-D between both lower 32-bit lane halves. 5 2 C 3 and
D A 4 B is a feasible solution, with no more than two adjacent bytes and
exactly equal quality in both lanes. The final permutation is 7 8 6 9 D A
4 B 0 F 1 E 5 2 C 3. If we partition the inputs into two 64-bit parts and
view these as ‘highway lanes’, the bytes (nearly) alternate between these two
lanes. We therefore borrow the term ‘zipper merge’ from the road context.
Note that this particular permutation is not necessarily optimal – it would
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be interesting, but computationally expensive, to optimize it based on the
resulting hash bit bias (discussed in Section 6).
4.2 Update
The proposed Update folds a 32 byte vector of inputs (packet) into the
1024-bit internal state by multiplying and permuting. The state variables
v0, v1, mul0 and mul1 are partitioned into independent 64-bit lanes.
v1 += packet ;
v1 += mul0 ;
mul0 ˆ= V4x64U( mm256 mul epu32 ( v1 , v0 >> 3 2 ) ) ;
v0 += mul1 ;
mul1 ˆ= V4x64U( mm256 mul epu32 ( v0 , v1 >> 3 2 ) ) ;
v0 += ZipperMerge ( v1 ) ;
v1 += ZipperMerge ( v0 ) ;
V4x64U is a vector class with overloaded operators, which are more convenient
than using SIMD intrinsics directly. However, some operations such as the
crucial _mm256_mul_epu32 multiplication must be expressed using intrinsics
because there is no C equivalent. This multiplies the lower 32 bits of its
operands, yielding a 64-bit result. Note the symmetrical structures, which
resemble the butterfly portion of Fast Fourier Transforms (FT). This is
reasonable – recursive discrete FT also need to combine or mix their inputs
in a similar way. The key operations here are permutations of the input and
state, which helps ensure no information about the key leaks (see the analysis
in Section 6). Note that the multiplication latency is partially hidden behind
other instructions because mul are only needed in the next Update. There
is no need to similarly delay ZipperMerge because its latency is just one
cycle [10].
4.3 Finalization
After consuming all input data, the internal state must be further mixed
to reduce the risk of key leakage. It is convenient to use the same Update
function. How many rounds are necessary? We hashed all 224 combinations
of three input bytes and computed the probability of an output bit toggling
in response to an input bit changing. Strong biases remain after two rounds,
but decrease by a factor of 300 after three rounds to 0.03%. We added a
fourth round for safety, which did not have a measurable impact on the
average bias.
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To ensure the upper vector lanes are mixed into the final result, we
must also permute them between each round. Note that ZipperMerge only
combines adjacent lanes. The AVX2 instruction set generally does not allow
interaction between the 128-bit halves of a vector, presumably to allow reuse
of logic from prior 128-bit SSE2 hardware. However, 64-bit lanes can be
shuffled at modest latency cost via _mm256_permutevar8x32_epi32. We
swap the 128-bit vector halves and also 32-bit lane halves of v0 using the
following indices of 32-bit parts: 2 3 0 1 6 7 4 5. The result is passed to
Update and this process repeated another three times.
We then add together the four state vectors v* and mul*, reducing the
1024-bit state into four 64-bit lanes. Mixing via addition is slightly more
thorough than XOR because of carry ripples. A 64-bit hash suffices for
many applications, in which case we only retain the lower lane, which is
slightly easier to extract into general-purpose registers. Note that a quantum
algorithm can find collisions in O( 3
√
N) time [12]. If a hash is to resist such
attacks, it should consist of at least 192 bits (N = 2192). HighwayHash can
produce up to 256-bit hashes at no additional cost; they also pass our test
suite. However, our analysis of differential attacks in Section 6.2 only applies
to the 64-bit case. HighwayHash needs further strengthening and analysis
before it can serve as a cryptographically secure message digest.
4.4 Initialization
We assume 256 key bits are reasonable and sufficient. Attackers have an
astronomically low, 1 in 2256−s chance of guessing the key after evaluating
2s inputs. The key must be expanded fourfold to populate the 1024 bits
of internal state. A two-fold expansion is achieved by initializing v0 with
the key XOR a constant, and v1 with the key (each lane rotated by 32 bits)
XOR a second constant. To make clear that there is no malicious intent
behind the choice of constants, we use “nothing up my sleeve” numbers and
document the process. We begin with a hexadecimal representation of the
initial digits of pi [13]. To ensure each bit is set in at least one of the four
lanes, we modify the fourth number by setting each bit if zero or one other
lanes have that bit set. Finally, we initialize mul0, mul1 to the first and
second constant, respectively.
4.5 Padding
Update operates on entire 32-byte vectors, so inputs must be padded to
multiples of that size. It is important that zero-valued buffers of various sizes
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yield different hash results. The only difference is their length, so a common
approach is to inject an encoding of the length into the input data. This
can require another mixing round if the input was a multiple of the vector
size. To minimize the likelihood of this happening, SipHash [1] inserts only
one byte encoding the size modulo 256. We instead suggest updating the
state directly, with a similar result as if the length had been inserted into the
input data. This avoids the overhead of splicing a length code into a SIMD
vector, which can be costly. However, requiring the total size is burdensome
for applications that incrementally hash a stream of data. It should not be
necessary to maintain a separate counter in addition to the 1024-bit internal
state. We therefore inject only the size modulo 32 because size / 32 does
not add much information, especially compared to the mixing that already
occurs from every HighwayHash Update. To accelerate avalanching of these
five bits, we broadcast them into each of the eight 32-bit vector lanes before
adding to v0. For the same reason, we also permute v1 based on the size.
One convenient option is to rotate the 32-bit lanes by this amount. Given
the lack of rotate instructions, we resort to two shifts, which is not a major
cost because it only happens once before finalization.
Padding would be much simpler if we could read past the end of the input
buffer, but this can trigger page faults or runtime safety checks. Conceptually,
we need to copy the remaining 0-31 bytes into a buffer, load it into a vector
and then Update. An architectural limitation motivates a slightly different
approach. Stores to memory or even cache involve considerable latency. To
speed up subsequent loads, CPUs forward data directly from intermediate
store buffers. However, smaller unaligned stores (from copying the remainder
bytes) cannot be combined to satisfy a larger load of the entire vector [14]. We
instead use the new AVX2 instruction _mm_maskload_epi32 to load multiples
of four bytes. The remaining zero to three bytes are loaded individually,
using only a single conditional branch, and inserted into the packet. AVX2
requires the insertion position to be a compile-time constant, so we insert
into the most-significant four bytes.
4.6 Source Code
Our HighwayHash implementation [9] was published as open source software
in March 2016 under the Apache 2 license. Its SIMD operations are expressed
using V4x64U, a custom AVX2 vector class with overloaded operators. For
example, V4x64U a = b + c is easier to understand than the equivalent
SIMD intrinsic __m256i a = _mm256_add_epi64(b, c). To support older
CPUs, we also provide a SSE4.1 variant which is about equally fast for
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small inputs, with about 80% of the AVX2 throughput for large inputs. An
efficient dispatch mechanism called InstructionSets checks the current
CPU capabilities and jumps to the appropriate implementation. These are
packaged as template specializations, which avoids the overhead of a virtual
function call. This also enables HighwayHash to be embedded in a larger
inlined block of processor-specific code, with the dispatcher hoisted out of any
loops to minimize its overhead. Note that SIMD intrinsics require an -mavx2
flag, which allows the compiler to generate AVX2 code everywhere. This can
lead to crashes if inline functions are compiled with different flags in multiple
translation units. Our InstructionSets scheme avoids this by compiling
SIMD code in separate translation units, taking great care to avoid inline
functions in their shared headers. This implies that the dispatch overhead
includes a direct jump, which is inexpensive and only occurs infrequently if
callers are able to dispatch at a high level (outside of the inner loop).
5 Throughput
We took unusual care in measuring the throughput of the hash functions.
SipHash, SipTreeHash and HighwayHash are implemented in C++, the latter
two using AVX2 intrinsics, and compiled by a patched version of GCC 4.9
with flags -std=c++11 -O3 -march=haswell -fno-exceptions -fno-tree-vrp
-fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-strict-aliasing -fPIE. Note that building
with unmodified GCC 6.3 leads to about 10% lower throughput, whereas the
4.8.4 release results in three times slower code. This is apparently caused by
frequently spilling vector registers to memory. It is unclear why the register
allocations of the 6.3 and patched 4.9 compilers are more efficient.
The benchmark runs on a single core of a desktop Xeon E5-2690 v3 clocked
at 2.6 GHz. We record high-resolution timestamps from the invariant TSC
and use fences to ensure the measured code is not reordered by the compiler
or CPU. To prevent elision of the benchmark computations, we pass the hash
result as input constraints to an empty inline assembly block. This forces
the compiler to assume that the result is used because the block allegedly
modifies memory. Prior measurements included the cost of initializing the
1 KiB input buffers. This has been greatly reduced by only initializing the
first 8 bytes.
We avoid unrealistic branch prediction rates by randomly interleaving
measurements for various sizes, rather than repeatedly hashing the same
input size. Note that the benchmark frequently accesses the same data, which
ensures it is cache-resident, so the resulting throughput is an upper bound.
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However, this is common in benchmarks and can be ignored because the
single-core hash throughput is lower than the observed memory bandwidth,
and far below the peak bandwidth [15]. To eliminate any outliers due to
background activity or thermal throttling, we use a robust estimator (the
mode). The resulting measurements have a mean absolute deviation of about
0.2 cycles; we retain the median as the final result. This ‘nanobenchmark’
performance measuring infrastructure is included in the open-source release
[9].
Table 1 lists throughputs for several input sizes in the usual unit of CPU
cycles per byte. For 1 KB inputs, SipTreeHash and HighwayHash are 2.2 and
5.3 times as fast as SipHash. Reducing SipHash rounds from 2 per update
and 4 during finalization to 1 and 3 also increases its throughput by a factor
of 1.2 to 1.9. HighwayHash is 1.4 to 1.9 times as fast as SipTreeHash13.
Table 1: Cycles per byte for various input sizes [bytes].
Algorithm 8 31 32 63 64 1024
SipHash 8.13 2.58 2.73 1.87 1.93 1.26
SipHash13 6.96 2.09 2.12 1.32 1.33 0.68
SipTreeHash 16.51 4.57 4.09 2.22 2.29 0.57
SipTreeHash13 12.33 3.47 3.06 1.68 1.63 0.33
HighwayHashSSE41 8.00 2.11 1.75 1.13 0.96 0.30
HighwayHashAVX2 7.34 1.81 1.71 1.04 0.95 0.24
Throughput increases for larger inputs (Figure 1) because the finalization cost
is amortized over more data. SipTreeHash is slower than SipHash for smaller
inputs because it processes entire 32-byte AVX2 vectors, and also hashes the
intermediate results. However, AVX2 SIMD instructions can process four
64-bit elements at a time, so SipTreeHash eventually overtakes SipHash. It
would be faster still if SIMD instruction sets supported bit rotations, which
are currently emulated with three instructions. Note the periodic decreases
at multiples of 32 bytes in both tree hashes. Inputs are padded to entire
vectors, so relative throughput decreases as padding increases. To capture
this, we measured the throughput at sizes 32 · i+ {0, 9, 18, 27}, which covers
all four possible values of size modulo 4. For HighwayHash, the best case
is a multiple of 32, which requires no padding. SipHash was designed to
efficiently handle small inputs and is less affected by input size and padding.
The tree hashes are much faster for large inputs because they process 32
bytes at a time. Surprisingly, HighwayHash outperforms SipHash for small
inputs due to the optimized padding described in Section 4.5.
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Figure 1: Throughput [bytes per cycle] increases with input size, but with
dips or peaks at multiples of the packet size. SipTreeHash is slower than
SipHash for small inputs but twice as fast for large inputs. HighwayHash is
faster for all sizes due to its optimized padding scheme.
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6 Security Analysis
We are not experienced cryptographers, and do not see a way to reduce the
HighwayHash algorithm to provably secure constructions. This multiply-
permute scheme may require new methods of cryptanalysis. In the absence
of a formal proof, we rely on statistical testing to validate our main claim:
HighwayHash is a keyed hash that is indistinguishable from a uniformly
random source, with an avalanche effect comparable to a cryptographically
random number generator.
6.1 smhasher Test Suite
smhasher [16] is a test suite for hash functions that verifies their output
distribution and checks for collisions when hashing ‘difficult’ inputs. Recall
that CLHash (without additional mixing) fails the avalanche test [6], which
requires that half of the output bits change when an input bit is flipped. We
further strengthen this test by checking all input sizes between 4 and 32 bytes1
and raising the iteration count from 300K to 30M. Previously, smhasher
reported the resulting maximum bias for each size. However, these are prone
to outliers. To prevent this, we draw 49 bias samples using different input
and hash seeds, and retain the median. We also improve the quality of the
random inputs. A generator with period p should not be asked to produce
more than 3
√
p numbers [17]. The input data for all sizes are populated
from 78 64-bit random numbers. This implies a minimum period of 2116,
which rules out common generators such as XorShift64 and Tausworthe (288).
We instead use the pcg64_k32 permuted congruential generator [18] with
a much larger period of 22176. The avalanche test is considered successful
if each output bit has a bias (deviation from the expected 50% bit flip
rate) of less than 1%. FarmHash 1.1’s Fingerprint642 [19], a recent fast
non-cryptographic hash, results in 62-77% bias for 25-32 byte inputs. This
may enable key recovery or collision attacks. The other hashes have less
than 0.08% bias (Figure 2). To estimate a lower bound, we also computed
the bias of a high-quality random number generator masquerading as a hash
function. Intel’s RDRAND is a cryptographically secure generator based on
an AES block cipher, periodically reseeded from observations of thermal noise.
Interestingly, the SipHash and HighwayHash biases are indistinguishable
from that of the hardware random generator. We can only conclude that all
1Biases computed for 3 bytes are much larger and likely overestimates.
2Hash64WithSeed mixes more thoroughly, but its API contract does not guarantee
unchanging results.
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Figure 2: Median avalanche bias from 49 independent trials with random
inputs and keys. Both SipHash and HighwayHash appear to have avalanching
properties indistinguishable from the RDRAND cryptographically secure
random generator according to this test.
tested hash functions appear to mix equally thoroughly according to this
test.In addition to empirical verification, we discuss several possible attacks
and whether they apply to HighwayHash. Our attack model assumes that
the secret key is initially unknown.
6.2 Differential Attack
Let us begin by attempting a differential attack. Assume we start in a
randomized state, i.e. v0, v1 are uniformly distributed random variables,
which is holds true if the key was random. We will attempt to modify
sequential vectors A, B and C such that the state change caused by A is
reversed by B. The two rounds of Update have the following effect:
1 v1 += A;
2 v1 += mul0 ;
3 mul0 ˆ= V4x64U( mm256 mul epu32 ( v1 , v0 >> 3 2 ) ) ;
4 v0 += mul1 ;
5 mul1 ˆ= V4x64U( mm256 mul epu32 ( v0 , v1 >> 3 2 ) ) ;
12
6 v0 += ZipperMerge ( v1 ) ;
7 v1 += ZipperMerge ( v0 ) ;
8 v1 += B;
9 v1 += mul0 ;
10 mul0 ˆ= V4x64U( mm256 mul epu32 ( v1 , v0 >> 3 2 ) ) ;
11 v0 += mul1 ;
12 mul1 ˆ= V4x64U( mm256 mul epu32 ( v0 , v1 >> 3 2 ) ) ;
13 v0 += ZipperMerge ( v1 ) ;
14 v1 += ZipperMerge ( v0 ) ;
15 v1 += C;
The last step is included in case C can help restore the value of v1. The
effect of A is to either change mul0 in line 3, or mul1 in line 5, except for a 1
in 232 chance that the 32 bit part of v0 is 0. In that case, v1 can probably be
corrected in line 8, but we have still changed v0, which cannot be corrected
before propagating to mul0 or mul1 with all but 1 in 232 chance, and the
differential attack fails because we are no longer able to influence mul0 or
mul1. The combined probability that both changes from A and B do not
affect either mul value is at most 1 in 264, so that approach also fails. The
other case is where we allow mul0 or mul1 to change in line 3 or 5, hoping it
will be corrected by the corresponding line 10 or 12. The probability of this
is 2−32, with a higher likelihood when we change only 1 bit in A and then B,
and lower when we change more bits. In line 3 or 5, there will be at least
a 32-bit random change in either mul0 or mul1, which propagates to v0 or
v1 in line 9 or 11. Correcting v0 or v1 is at best another 1 in 232 chance in
lines 13-15, and again the attack fails. Note that this analysis holds even
in the first vector where the mul0 and mul1 values are known, but v0 and
v1 are random. Longer differentials that include a subsequent vector are
too late to help because changing one or more bit in A will avalanche from
adding/XORing/multiplying at least 64 bits of random initial state at line 1
from v0 v1 mul0 mul1 into each other after line 11.
6.3 Length Extension Attacks
Length extension attacks are infeasible because the calls to PermuteAndUpdate
during finalization differ from previous calls to Update. In particular, the
permutation involves neighboring lanes, whereas regular Update invocations
do not. Also, the state is random, depending on the secret key, and permutes
in a manner that avalanches to new states on each call to Update, regardless
of the vector values. In cases where the input length is not a multiple of
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the vector size (32 bytes), the padding scheme ensures that messages with
various numbers of trailing zero bytes result in different hashes.
6.4 Entropy Loss
When all input vectors except one are held constant, the final state will
differ for all 2256 possible vector values, because Update is a permutation.
Compression only occurs when injecting input data and discarding all but
the 64 output bits during finalization.
6.5 Rotational Attacks
The security of an ARX (Add, Rotate, XOR) scheme S depends on the
number of additions q [20]. For n-bit inputs I and a rotation function R we
have
Z = P (R(x+ y, r) = R(x, r) +R(y, r)) = (1 + 2r−n + 2−r + 2−n).
P [S(R(I, r)) = R(S(I), r)] = Zq
For an ARX scheme with too few additions, we can detect non-randomness
in the function by showing that S(R(I, r)) = R(S(I), r) more than a random
function, the probability of which is 2−n for an n-bit hash function. For
example, SipHash (with 2 update and 4 finalization rounds) involves 13
additions. The resulting state values, when XORed together, will be the
same whether we rotate the inputs by 32 or just the output by 32 with
probability 4−13 = 2−26. If keys are reused and attackers choose the input, a
significant bias should be detectable. However, it is not clear how this can
be used to either create collisions or reveal the key. Direct rotational attacks
to not seem to apply to the multiplier, since the output is 64-bits whereas
each operand is 32 bits. However, each multiplier contributes on the average
16 32-bit additions, and the four finalization rounds include 8 multiplications
for a total average of 128 32-bit additions. For the results to be equal after
rotating both inputs by 16, we need the upper 16 bits of one operand to be 0,
and the lower 16 bits of the other to be 0, with probability 2−32. The chance
of this happening throughout all finalization rounds is negligible. With a
total of 32 multiplications (4 lanes times 8), the resulting 1 in 41024 bias is
far too small to detect.
6.6 SAT Solvers
Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solvers have been applied to the problem of
deriving unknown key bits when the attacker knows most bits of the key in
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SipHash. Modified versions that use fewer finalization rounds were found
to be vulnerable to modern SAT solvers. However, formal verification of
CPU multiplier circuits remains a challenge. Polynomial time solutions for
verification have been discovered, but they rely on algebraic properties of
multiplication and cannot be used on larger circuits also including XOR gates.
We therefore expect HighwayHash to be far more resistant to SAT-solver
based key extraction than traditional ARX hash functions such as SipHash.
7 Conclusion
Faster hashing could save enormous amounts of CPU time in data centers.
However, algorithms entirely focused on speed, including Murmur3 and
CityHash, are vulnerable to attacks [3]. For example, adversaries can skew
the distribution of ‘random’ decisions. We describe a strengthened version of
the smhasher test suite [16] that reveals a previously unknown weakness in
Fingerprint64 from FarmHash 1.1 [19] (but not Hash64WithSeed, which
is fast and well-distributed). Applications should not use such unsafe hash
functions unless they trust their input data. SipHash is a widely used
pseudo-random function for which no relevant attacks are known. However,
it is relatively slow (1.25 cycles per byte for 1 KB inputs). We propose
HighwayHash, a novel keyed hash that is about 5 times as fast thanks to SIMD
multiply and permute instructions. The source code is available under the
permissive Apache 2 license at https://github.com/google/highwayhash.
To the best of our (non-expert) ability, we have analyzed the algorithm and
found no weaknesses. Statistical tests indicate the HighwayHash output
bits are as uniformly distributed as the cryptographically secure RDRAND
generator. We also considered powerful attacks, including differential and
rotational, and are confident the algorithm will withstand these specific
attacks. We welcome further cryptanalysis – the family of hash functions
built from multiplications and byte permutations had not been studied
yet. Assuming this construction remains unbroken, it appears useful for
pseudo-random number generators and fast message authentication codes.
Strengthened variants may also substantially accelerate stream ciphers and
file hashing.
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